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AEREO, IN-LINE LINKING, AND A NEW APPROACH
TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT FOR EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES
Shannon McGovern+
“Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it
universally accessible and useful.”1
Google receives approximately two million queries every second and
produces results to each search in a fraction of a second.2 In 2007 and 2010,
Google faced allegations of copyright infringement brought by Perfect 10,
Inc. 3 —an online business that sold photographs of nude models to its
subscribers.4 In Perfect 10 v. Amazon, Inc.,5 Perfect 10 took issue with Google’s
practice of producing thumbnail images, via the Google Image search service,
of Perfect 10’s copyrighted content.6 Moreover, the thumbnail images linked to
full-size versions of the images that appeared within a Google Web page under
Google’s logo.7 The images, in fact, were not located on Google’s Web page or
even on Google’s server. 8 Rather, Google’s Web page simply linked to the
copyrighted image residing on Perfect 10’s server, which generally was only
accessible to paying subscribers. 9 On the surface, a user’s interaction with
Google’s Image service looks and feels illicit—Google was displaying the
images without Perfect 10’s permission and portraying full-quality versions as
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2013, Washington and Lee University. The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Megan
La Belle for her expertise and guidance on this topic and her colleagues on the Catholic University
Law Review for their contributions to this Note. Lastly, the author wishes to thank her family for
their unwavering love and support during the writing process and throughout law school.
1. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). In 1998,
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, whom met at Stanford University, founded Google. Company,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/company (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
2. Jillian D’Onfro & Dylan Love, 11 Crazy-Interesting Facts About Google, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 12, 2014, 9:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/crazy-interesting-facts-about-google2014-8?op=1.
3. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484, 2010 WL 9479060, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010) aff’d,
653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011).
4. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1154.
5. 508 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2007).
6. See id. at 1155–56, 57.
7. Id. at 1156.
8. Id. at 1160.
9. See id. at 1157.
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if the images were a part of its own Web page.10 Nevertheless, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that this behavior—referred to as
“in-line linking”—did not directly infringe upon Perfect 10’s exclusive right to
copy and display its photographs.11
As it turned out, Google did not infringe upon Perfect 10’s copyright because
Google, having never saved the photos to its own servers, did not expressly
“copy” the images for the purposes of the Copyright Act. 12 Does this
technological distinction matter? Clearly, the Ninth Circuit believed it did.13
However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Broadcasting Cos.
v. Aereo Inc.14 suggests that alleged copyright infringers like Google may no
longer be able to avoid liability based on the perceived technological loopholes
evident in Perfect 10.
Aereo involved a different type of technology than Perfect 10, namely a
“service that allows [its subscribers] to watch television programs over the
Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air” via
“thousands of dime-sized antennas housed in a central warehouse.”15 The Court
held “that Aereo ‘perform[s]’ petitioners’ copyrighted works ‘publicly,’” as
defined by the Copyright Act, and therefore violates the cable companies’
copyright.16 This decision was partially founded in the Court’s determination
that when their “commercial objectives[s]” are essentially the same,
technological differences between Aereo and the cable companies becomes
irrelevant.17 The majority deliberately moved away from a technology-based
infringement analysis, noting that the subscribers to Aereo’s service were
indifferent to such distinctions and, at the end of the day, were able to view
infringing videos from their personal computers.18
This Note argues that, in an ever-changing technological landscape, strictly
adhering to the language and definitions of the Copyright Act in cases involving
emerging technologies may contravene the purpose and intent of copyright law.
It further argues that Aereo’s commercial interest rationale paves the way for a
new approach to technologically complex copyright cases. Part I of this Note
begins with an overview of copyright law, followed by a brief history of the
Internet and the World Wide Web, and provides an explanation of how Web
pages are created and how they interact and communicate with other Web pages.
Part I concludes with an overview of case law from the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Ninth and Seventh Circuits dealing with in-line linking and copyright
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1160–61.
Id. at 1159–60 (upholding the District Court’s decision).
Id. at 1160–61.
See id.
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
Id. at 2503.
Id. at 2511 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 2508.
See id. at 2507–08.
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infringement, revealing a tendency of courts to use technological distinctions to
find that in-line linking is not an infringing use of copyrighted content on the
Internet. Part II analyzes the recent Supreme Court decision in Aereo, with
emphasis on the majority’s “commercial interest” discussion. Finally, Part III
of this Note will show how the rationale in Aereo seamlessly translates to in-line
linking of Web content, and Part IV concludes that an application of the
“commercial interest” analysis could change the outcome of future copyright
infringement cases involving in-line linking of creative content.
I. THE AMORPHOUS LANDSCAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT LAW
A. A Legal Tradition: The Basics of Copyright Doctrine
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”19 Accordingly, Congress enacted the Copyright Act
to incentivize creativity and the sharing of knowledge.20 The Copyright Act
gives authors of creative original works21 five “exclusive rights” to reproduce,
distribute, prepare derivative works, publicly perform,22 and publicly display the
original work.23 An original work is “created” once it is “fixed” in some tangible
form,24 such that it may be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration.”25 An intrusion on any one of the
author’s five exclusive rights is infringement.26
A person who infringes on another’s copyright need not have intended to do
so; rather, he need only have in fact copied the original work.27 The Act defines
“copies” of original works as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . .
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated.”28 On the other hand, a “derivative work” is not an exact copy
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
21. The bar measuring creativity of a work is “extremely low” and allows most creative works
to qualify for copyright protections as long as they “posess[] at least some minimal degree of
creativity.” See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
22. 17 U.S.C § 101 (2012). The Copyright Act states that “perform” means to “render” a
work “either directly or by means of any device or process,” or to show an audiovisual work’s
“images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” Id. To perform
“publicly” refers to doing so anywhere that is “open to the public” or where “a substantial number
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.” Id.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
27. Carter v. Haw. Transp. Co., 201 F. Supp. 301, 302 (D. Haw. 1961).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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of an original work, but rather a copy consisting of “editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship.”29 A good example of a derivative work is a motion
picture that is based on a copyrighted book.
A party proves infringement by showing, first, that he owns the copyright to
the work in question and, second, that the defendant has copied the work in
violation of the copyright.30 In practice, a plaintiff proves copying by showing
that the defendant’s work bears “substantial similarity” to the original and that
the defendant had access to the original.31 The determination of “substantial
similarity” between an original and alleged copy is ascertained by the “‘ordinary
observer’ test,” that is, “whether an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”32 If the
defendant has indeed copied the plaintiff’s work, the investigation’s next step is
to decide whether the copying was an impermissible appropriation.33 Again, the
test to determine whether the copy “reach[es] the point of ‘unlawful
appropriation,’ or the copying of the protected expression itself,” and thus
infringement, is a question for the lay observer.34
When third parties are involved in infringing activities, particularly in an
Internet setting, parties who have not directly infringed on an author’s copyright
may nonetheless be liable as indirect infringers.35 An indirect, or contributory
infringer is one who has control over a third party’s use of copyrighted materials
and fails to regulate direct infringement by the third parties. 36 To prove
contributory infringement, a claimant must show that the contributory infringer
“‘kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know’ of direct infringement,” and somehow
“encourage[d] or assist[ed]” the infringement.”37 Similarly, entities in a position
29. Id.
30. Ferguson v. NBC, 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978).
31. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977)
(citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179
F. Supp. 751, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“[I]t is virtually impossible to adduce direct proof of copying
. . . . Evidence of copying must necessarily be circumstantial and is ordinarily based on proof of
access and similarity.”)).
32. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022–23 (2d Cir. 1966) (citing Comptone
Co. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1958)).
33. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (noting the distinction of illegal copying).
34. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164–65 (9th Cir. 1977) superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), as recognized
in Segal v. Rogue Pictures, 544 F. App’x 769, 770 (9th Cir. 2013).
35. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928, 941 (2005)
(defining contributory and vicarious liability).
36. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)
(determining Sony not liable for contributory infringement despite the fact that Sony manufactured
a VCR recorder and knew it could be used to record copyrighted movies and programs without
Universal’s permission).
37. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2001).
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to both supervise a third party’s infringement and to directly profit from the
infringement will, absent any viable defense, be held vicariously liable for the
impermissible use of the work.38
The Copyright Act provides for various affirmative defenses to infringement,
including the fair use doctrine. 39 The fair use defense is designed to
“balance First Amendment concerns with the protections otherwise afforded
authors by the Copyright Act.”40 Section 107 states that unauthorized use of
copyrighted material for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” may
constitute fair use.41 In deciding whether a defendant’s infringing use is fair,
courts must balance four factors: “(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”42 In
other words, the fair use defense is always assessed on a case-by-case basis.
B. Contemporary Developments and Universal Connectivity
Since its inception, the Internet has, by its very nature, represented
connectivity and innovation.43 Communications via the Internet consisted of
38. Id. at 1022. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act generally exempts Internet service
providers from contributory or vicarious liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2012); see, e.g.,
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025 (discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
40. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2010).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Courts have made clear that even a use that falls within one of the
enumerated categories in Section 107 is not automatically fair use. See Douglas L. Rogers,
Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use—Analyzing The Google Litigation to Unleash
Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 24 n.93 (2007). Courts utilize the
four-factor test when determining fair use. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter.,
471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985) (applying the four fair-use factors “identified by Congress as
especially relevant in determining whether the use was fair”).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
43. See RON WHITE, HOW COMPUTERS WORK 309–11 (Todd Brakke et al. eds., 9th ed.
2010). The Internet was the product of a government project initiated by President Eisenhower in
1958 called the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). Id. at 309; see also ARPA-DARPA:
The Name Chronicles, DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/About/History/ARPA-DARPA__The_
Name_Chronicles.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). The Internet began with the first computer
network, ARPANET (Advanced Projects Research Agency Network), consisting of four
universities collaborating on research into the development of a worldwide Web system. Imagining
the Internet: A History and Forecast, ELON U. SCH. COMM., http://www.elon.edu/e-web/
predictions/about.xhtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). ARPA’s initial focus, American space travel,
was eventually turned over to NASA and ARPA became a sponsor for university research projects.
WHITE, supra, at 309. ARPA researchers developed ARPAnet, a network connecting computers at
discrete university locations, to facilitate communications and information sharing among the
researchers. Id. at 310. Thus, the Internet was born, and in 1991 the National Science Foundation
opened the Internet to the public. See id. at 311.
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text only until Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 198944 and
the Internet expanded into a multi-media platform that supports graphics, sound,
and video. 45 Since 1991, the Internet has stretched worldwide, creating a
“network with more than 100 million users that are linked for the exchange of
data, news, conversation, and commerce.”46
Berners-Lee designed the World Wide Web as a “universal” platform for
information sharing such that users can “link to absolutely any piece of
information.”47 Berners-Lee has said “universality is essential to the Web: it
looses [sic] its power if there are certain types of things to which you can’t
link.”48
Today, there are so many people using the Internet that researchers can only
estimate as to the exact number. 49 Within the Web framework there are
44. Tim Berners-Lee, W3, http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2015). Tim Berners-Lee is an English computer scientist and is the Director of the World Wide
Web Consortium, “a Web standards organization founded in 1994 which develops interoperable
technologies (specifications, guidelines, software, and tools) to lead the Web to its full potential.”
Id.
45. WHITE, supra note 43, at 311.
46. Id. at 312; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923
F. Supp. 1231, 1238 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing the Internet as a “network of networks” for
global communications). The International Telecommunication Union predicts that “by [the] end
[of] 2014, there will be almost 3 billion Internet users.” Press Release, ITU, ITU Releases 2014
ICT Figures, ITU (May 5, 2014), http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2014/23.aspx#.
VGS7EvTF8uo.
47. Tim Berners-Lee, Realising the Full Potential of the Web, W3 (Dec. 3, 1997),
http://www.w3.org/1998/02/Potential.html. According to Berners-Lee, “universality” means
providing access to facts and science, constructing a forum for collaboration, and sharing a medium
for art and literature and opening works to discussion and subjective analysis. Id. In Berners-Lee’s
opinion, anything and everything should be accessible. Id.
48. Id. Berners-Lee noted:
For [the Web] to work, it had to be not only easy to “browse”, but also easy to express
oneself. In a world of people and information, the people and information should be in
some kind of equilibrium. Anything in the Web can be quickly learned by a person and
any knowledge you see as being missing from the Web can be quickly added. The Web
should be a medium for the communication between people: communication through
shared knowledge. For this to work, the computers, networks, operating systems and
commands have to become invisible, and leave us with an intuitive interface as directly
as possible to the information.
Id.
49. Imagining the Internet, supra note 43. The number of Internet users has grown
exponentially from approximately forty-five million users in 1996 to a number unable to accurately
be calculated. Id. For any task not intuitive to the average user, simple Google searches return
practically infinite websites, blogs, and discussion forums that provide instructions on anything
from troubleshooting tips to instructions to build a personal website. See, e.g., Philip Bloom,
Uploading Videos to the Internet: Six Easy-to-Follow Steps, PROF. PHOTOGRAPHER MAG. (Mar. 4,
2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.ppmag.com/web-exclusives/2010/03/video-to-internet.html
(explaining how to upload a video file to the Internet in just “Six Easy-to-Follow Steps,” noting
that, “[i]n general, uploading videos to websites is a fairly easy process”).
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components that support the use and demand for the large amounts of data
associated with any graphic or video file.50
The Web consists of Internet servers that store and supply files to clients and
can link to other servers.51 Servers can read Hyper Text Markup Language, or
HTML, documents and translate them into a Web page.52 HTML is a series of
“tags,” or keywords, designating elements contained on the Web page, such as
text, images, and links.53 A Web browser that resides on a personal computer,54
such as Safari or Google Chrome, interprets the HTML tags and displays the
designated content as specified by the HTML code, generating the page seen by
the end user on his computer screen.55
HTML supports the use of links, or connections, between Web pages.56 Most
users interact with hyperlinks, which might be a short phrase or icon that
“conceals” a Web address to another Web page.57 A user may click on these
embedded links, or “pointer[s],” and be instantly taken from one website to
another.58 These links initiate a “source” anchor that connects to a “destination”
anchor, “which may be any Web resource (e.g., an image, a video clip, a sound
bite, a program, an HTML document, an element within an HTML document,
etc.).” 59 Linking facilitates much of the functionality the Internet provides,
including providing easy access, efficient research capabilities, and extensive
resources.60 For such a “simple” function, “the link has been one of the primary
forces driving the success of the Web.”61
Links that simply take a user from one Web page to another are “direct
links.”62 The utility and the “power of the Web stems from the ability of a link

50. WHITE, supra note 43, at 361. The volume of data is managed by bandwidth, or the
“capacity of a channel to carry information.” Id. at 311. In other words, bandwidth determines
how much data can be transmitted at a given time and thus, wider bandwidths facilitate faster data
communication. See id.
51. Id. at 313.
52. See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (defining HTML and the dynamic between
HTML code and Web pages).
53. See WHITE, supra note 43, at 370 (explaining that “HTML is a collection of codes
enclosed in angle brackets — <> — that control the formatting of text in the file”).
54. Id. at 311.
55. HTML Introduction, W3SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.w3schools.com/html/html_intro.asp
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
56. Links, W3, http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/struct/links.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2015).
57. WHITE, supra note 43, at 368.
58. Hypertext Linking and Copyright Issues, AM. LIBR. ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/
copyright/copyrightarticle/hypertextlinking (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
59. Links, supra note 56.
60. Hypertext Linking and Copyright Issues, supra note 58.
61. Links, supra note 56.
62. Hypertext Linking and Copyright Issues, supra note 58.
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to point to any document, regardless of its status or physical location.” 63 A
website consists of any number of Web pages including the website’s “home
page,” which a visitor generally views first prior to clicking on links to navigate
to other pages within the website.64 Although it is efficient and customary to
have on one’s Web page, direct linking to other websites can be a controversial
practice if such a use encroaches upon the boundaries of copyright law.65
Despite links having proven to be a driving force behind the accessibility of
the Web, 66 problems have arisen with respect to certain types of linking
practices. First, website owners have complained about a practice called “deep
linking,” in which a hyperlink allows users to bypass a website’s home page and
be taken directly to a destination Web page within the website.67 This practice
concerns website publishers who primarily place advertisements on the
homepage because visitors generally access a website’s home page first. 68
When a third party posts a hyperlink to an interior page of the source website,
visitors can access sought-after information without ever visiting the homepage,
denying the owner of the home page’s potential ad revenue.69 Over the past
fifteen years, United States courts have considered arguments concerning the
legality of deep linking, but so far no such ruling has been made.70
The permissibility of deep linking was considered in Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc.,71 in which Tickets.com provided links on its website directing
visitors to a particular interior page on Ticketmaster’s website, bypassing
Ticketmaster’s homepage. 72 Ticketmaster alleged copyright infringement by

63. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
64. See Brian D. Wassom, Copyright Implications of “Unconventional Linking” on the World
Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and Inlining, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 181, 192 (1998)
(describing the home page as the “front door” to a website—noting that the home page generally
explains the site’s purpose and displays links that give a user an idea of the site’s “navigational
structure”).
65. See Mike Masnick, Is Inline Linking to an Image Copyright Infringement?, TECHDIRT
(Jan. 6, 2010, 7:28 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100105/0109067611.stml; Foye
Robinson, How to Create a Direct Link, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how_5340920_createdirect.html (last visited Apr. 4. 2015).
66. Links, supra note 56.
67. See Wassom, supra note 64, at 192–93 (providing a background on deep linking).
68. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., CV 99-76542, 2000 WL 525390, at *2, *4
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
69. See Wassom, supra note 64, at 192–93.
70. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003); Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 525390, at
*2, *4.
71. CV 99-76542, 2000 WL 525390, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000).
72. Id. at *1. Tickets.com sold some tickets from its site, but primarily provided information
to visitors about where and how they might purchase tickets along with direct links to interior pages
on Ticketmaster’s website. Id.
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Tickets.com.73 The court held that deep linking is not inherently a copyright
violation because no actual copying of information occurs.74 Rather, the visitor
that clicks on the link is simply transferred to the source site and “there is no
deception in what is happening.”75
Another practice that has raised serious concern is “in-line linking,” in which
media from a source website is displayed on, and appears as part of, the linking
website.76 Instead of taking the user to the full destination Web page as a direct
link would, an in-line link facilitates a connection between the linking website
and the source website so that the user has full access to the source website’s
media, without ever leaving the linking website.77 In fact, the user generally has
no idea the content does not actually reside on the linking site.78
Not all in-line linking is devious,79 but it undeniably has the capability to harm
a source website’s commercial interests in its content, especially when the
content is linked without the source’s permission.80 Not only might the linking
website use the source’s potentially creative works without credit or permission,
but also the linking website may provide such unauthorized access using the
bandwidth paid for by the source site while denying the source site the
commercial benefits of those users. 81 Outside of agreements between
73. Id.
74. See id. at *2.
75. Id.
76. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003); Mark Sableman, Link
Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1297 (2001)
(stating that the practice of in-line linking “[a]t the very least . . . seems sneaky,” and comparing it
to painting a picture of a museum gallery, in effect, “importing” the same visual experience onto
the copier’s canvas).
77. See Sableman, supra note 76, at 1297.
78. Id.
79. Zi Chu & Haining Wang, An Investigation of Hotlinking and Its Countermeasures, 34
COMPUTER COMM. 577, 577 (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.cs.wm.edu/~hnw/paper/
comcom11.pdf (describing a few benefits of in-line linking). Where both the source site and the
linking site have approved the in-line linking of the source site’s content or made some sort of
business arrangement, the linking is “benign.” Id. For instance, “a site may include some ad images
provided by an advertisement syndicator to make advertising revenue,” and “[i]t does not need to
host any ad images by itself, but link them from the syndicator’s server.” Id.
80. The Web development community regards this behavior as “unethical.” See id.
(describing Web developers who engage in unauthorized in-line linking as “lazy” and
“unprofessional”); see also Matthew Scherb, Free Content’s Future: Advertising, Technology, and
Copyright, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2004) (observing the tension between content
distributors’ commercial interest in drawing Internet traffic to their websites and the interactive
nature of the Internet that allows consumers to “easily manipulate content to avoid the very
advertisements supporting that content”).
81. Chu & Wang, supra note 79, at 577; see Brad M. Scheller, Hey, Keep Your Links to
Yourself! Legal Challenges to Thumbnails and Inline Linking on the Web and the Potential
Implications of a First Impression Decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 415, 433 (2003) (noting that the massive growth in Internet use “has created an influx of people
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companies, 82 scholars see potential for copyright issues in a technology that
“permit[s] a web publisher . . . to associate itself with the content of another
party and to create new adaptive web displays combining content from both
sites.”83
C. The “Server Test”: Courts Allow Infringing Behavior to Slip Through a
Technological Loophole
Several courts have examined copyright claims stemming from in-line
linking. This issue was first considered by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp.84 Kelly was a professional photographer who displayed and uploaded
some of his photographs to his own website, as well as to others through
licensing agreements.85 Arriba operated a search engine that produced results in

using the Web for commercial profit through advertisements and self-promotion,” and discussing
how website owners and advertisers are frustrated by the “multiple linking techniques that allow
users to avoid Web site advertisements and, in turn, hinder commercial exposure and a Web page
owner’s ability to charge for advertising”).
82. Amazon and Google have an agreement by which Amazon sends customer search queries
to Google, who actually performs the search and generates results that are in-line-linked to
Amazon’s Web page. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007).
To the Amazon customer the results appear to come directly from Amazon, as with any in-linelinked media, but Google is fully aware of the linking and gets paid for the service it provides, per
the agreement. See id.
83. Sableman, supra note 76, at 1297. Similar copyright concerns are associated with the
practice of “framing.” See Linking, Framing, Meta Tags, and Caching, HARV. L., http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/property00/metatags/main.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (discussing how framing
may “undermine the rights of Web site owners”). Framing creates “independently scrollable”
structures within a Web page within which anything from a single graphic to an entire external Web
page may be displayed. Sableman, supra note 76, at 1277. Concerns with framing were brought
to bear in 1997 when a number of news publishers, including The Washington Post, sued Total
News, a website that aggregates news from different sources and frames the articles on its own
website. Id. at 1299. The Total News site today is simply an aggregation of text hyperlinks to
news articles. See TOTAL NEWS, http://www.totalnews.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). The
plaintiffs’ concerns were, first, that Total News’s frames provided select parts of the linked Web
pages rather than the entire page the user would see if directly linked to the publishers’ pages, and,
second, that Total News’s frames cut out the publishers’ banner advertisements while Total News’s
advertisements surrounded the frames. Sableman, supra note 76, at 1273. The case settled on the
condition that Total News refrain from selectively framing, and rather link to whole Web pages
instead. Id. at 1300. Another framing case, Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., No.
CV 97-6991, 1998 WL 132922 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1997), actually proceeded to trial, but the
California District Court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that defendant’s framing practices were
confusing and deceptive because it was unable to identify an actual harm to plaintiff. Id. at *1.
Neither case produced particularly helpful guidelines in assessing problems with unauthorized
framing, but both certainly vindicated and exacerbated website owners’ concerns regarding the
potential violations of their commercial interests.
84. 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003).
85. Id. at 815.
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the form of thumbnail images,86 which in-line linked to full-sized images on
Kelly’s website, while still displaying Arriba’s logo and advertising.87 Kelly
sued, arguing that Arriba’s use of full-sized and thumbnail images owned by
Kelly was infringement.88
The Ninth Circuit held that the thumbnail images were “transformative,” and
therefore constituted fair use of Kelly’s copyrighted works.89 The court reached
this conclusion despite noting, as part of its fair use analysis, that Kelly had a
legitimate interest in drawing visitors to his website—both to sell his own
products and to generate advertising revenue.90 This holding hinged on the fact
that the thumbnails were much smaller and of lower quality than the full-sized
originals, which the court believed lessened the probability of viewers copying
the thumbnails and using them for display or resale. 91 However, the Ninth
Circuit ultimately punted the infringement analysis with respect to the full-sized
images on remand without any recommendations on the issue.92
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon,93 the Ninth Circuit adopted the “server test” to
address Google’s image search engine, which utilized in-line linking.94 Under
the server test, if a “computer owner . . . stores an image as electronic
information and serves that electronic information directly to the user,” he
infringes on the image owner’s copyright because he “displays” it within the
meaning of the Copyright Act. 95 Therefore, whether or not a person has
86. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, and rev’d
in part on other grounds, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). The software underlying the search engine
would search the Web for images, download full-sized copies onto Arriba’s server, and “generate
smaller, lower-resolution thumbnails of the images.” Id. at 938.
87. See id. at 938–39.
88. Id. at 938.
89. Id. at 943–44.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 944.
92. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit
stated that the District Court improperly addressed the infringement issues with respect to the fullsized images because neither party requested summary judgment as to the full-sized images. Id.
The fair use holding regarding Arriba’s use of the thumbnail images was affirmed on appeal. Id.
at 815.
93. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 1159. Google Image Search produces results to user queries in the form of small,
low-resolution thumbnail images. Id. at 1155. Google’s HTML code contains instructions that
locate the image source, download the full-sized image, and display it framed within a Google Web
page. Id. Google never saves the images, it in-line links to the images saved on the source’s server.
Id. at 1155 n.2. Perfect 10 sells photographs of nude models to customers who subscribe to its
website and pay a monthly fee for access to the website. Id. at 1157. From May 2001 to 2005,
Perfect 10 sent repeated takedown notices to Google warning of Google’s infringing use of Perfect
10’s images through the image search engine. Id. Perfect 10 filed a claim for copyright
infringement against Google in 2004, seeking an injunction to prevent Google from using Perfect
10 images in its thumbnail search results and in-line linking to the full versions. Id.
95. Id. at 1159–60.
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infringed on another’s exclusive display rights hinges on if and where data is
stored.96 The manner of sharing the data—such as in-line linking or framing—
bears no weight on the server test analysis. 97 The court decided that for
copyright purposes, a digital photo is “fixed in a tangible medium of
expression,” and any time the photo is stored on a server, a disk, or any storage
mechanism, such action constitutes making a “copy.”98
In carrying out the infringement analysis, the Amazon court continued to
analyze Google’s interactions 99 with Perfect 10’s images in terms of the
technological interactions with the photos.100 The court found that although
Google in-line linked to and displayed Perfect 10’s copyrighted full-sized
images, Google nonetheless did not infringe because it did not store those
images on Google’s servers and thus never made a “copy” within the meaning
of the Copyright Act. 101 The court explained that Google simply “provides
HTML instructions that direct a user’s browser to a website publisher’s
computer that stores the full-size photographic image,” and HTML code, the
court said, does not constitute a “copy.”102
In Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter,103 the Seventh Circuit examined a claim by
Flava Works104—a website that provides access to pornographic videos behind
a “pay wall.”105 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the in-line
linking of Flava’s videos by the social bookmarking site myVidster106 infringed
96. Id. at 1159.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1160 (internal quotations omitted); see also MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that saving a program to a computer’s memory
constituted the making of a “copy” of the program because the saved version could be “perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” and thus was “fixed” within the meaning of the
Copyright Act).
99. Both Google and Amazon addressed the same activity, but Amazon was implicated under
its agreement with Google. See supra note 82 (describing the agreement).
100. See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1160–61 (discussing the effect of storing an image).
101. See id. The District Court for the Northern District of California adopted the rule
established in Amazon.com that “in-line linking to a full-size image does not constitute direct
infringement,” to justify its finding that a search engine’s in-line linking to full-sized images owned
by Perfect 10 did not infringe on Perfect 10’s exclusive right to display the images. Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Yandex N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
102. See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1161. The Court reasoned that Google merely facilitated a
user’s ability to display Perfect 10’s images by providing HTML instructions to the user’s browser
and that the browser in turn “interact[ed]” with the server that stored the images. Id.
103. 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012).
104. Flava Works, Inc. was a company that produced and distributed pornographic videos to
host websites. See id. at 755.
105. Id. at 756. Viewers pay a fee in advance before they are given access to the videos and
“must agree not to copy, transmit, sell, etc. the video, although Flava’s terms of use permit the user
to download it to his computer for his ‘personal, noncommercial use’—only.” Id. at 756.
106. See id. at 756–57. myVidster provides a forum for visitors to submit the embed codes for
videos. Id. at 756. Using the embed code, myVidster designs a page to display the video that
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upon Flava’s copyright under a contributory infringement theory.107 The court
noted the negative impact myVidster’s website had on Flava’s business by
“encouraging its subscribers to circumvent Flava’s pay wall.”108 However, the
court was not persuaded that this facilitation amounted to infringement since the
visitors of myVidster bypassing Flava’s pay wall are “no more of a copyright
infringer than if [they] had snuck into a movie theater and watched a copyrighted
movie without buying a ticket.”109 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that
myVidster did not directly infringe on Flava’s reproduction and distribution
rights under the Copyright Act, nor did it induce such infringement.110 The court
based its finding in part on a technology-based analysis similar to the Ninth
Circuit’s server test. 111 The court held that had myVidster still offered its
“premium membership,” this would have altered the court’s analysis and
resulted in a finding for direct infringement because the membership offered a
“backup service,” which the court reasoned constituted making copies of videos
in violation of Flava’s exclusive rights to do so. 112 Because myVidster
discontinued the backup service and therefore no longer made “copies” of
videos, myVidster was not directly infringing on Flava’s exclusive rights.113
The Flava court encountered an issue similar to one that would present itself
to the Aereo Court: whether a website that streams copyrighted videos online
publicly performs them when the audience downloads and views the videos at
discreet times and places. 114 The court considered two interpretations of
“performance”:115 a performance could occur when a viewer uploads a video,
visitors access by clicking on a corresponding thumbnail image. Id. Clicking on the thumbnail
opens the video page that is streaming the video from the source website’s server, but appears in a
myVidster window with advertising that finances the myVidster site and for all intents and purposes
seems to be streaming from myVidster’s site. See id. The code contained within the thumbnail
image provides both the video’s address and playback instructions. Id. Flava Works’ customers
who paid for private use of the videos and then provided the embed code to myVidster were creating
unauthorized copies of Flava Works’s videos and therefore infringing on Flava Works’s copyright.
Id. at 757.
107. See id. at 758.
108. Id. at 757.
109. Id. at 758 (“The facilitator of conduct that doesn’t infringe copyright is not a contributory
infringer.”).
110. Id. at 761–62.
111. See id. at 760–62; see supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
112. Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 762–63. The court indicated that Flava might still have been
entitled to injunctive relief, even though myVidster no longer offered the subscription service and
thus was no longer “copying” videos. Id. at 762.
113. Id. at 762–63.
114. Id. at 761. The Seventh Circuit suggests it would be helpful in this case if Congress
established a more precise definition of public performance under the Copyright Act, which could
be indicative of the Copyright Act’s weakening efficacy in deciding copyright issues in a rapidly
evolving technological landscape. Id.; see infra note 193 and accompanying text.
115. Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 760–61.
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thus making himself “capable of viewing it” and placing greater responsibility
on the third-party viewer; or a performance could occur when a viewer actually
plays the video, thus placing greater liability on the hosting party.116 The court
seemed hesitant to proscribe a definition that would make myVidster liable
because technically, myVidster never interacted with the image data. 117
Ultimately, the court found that myVidster did not encourage such infringement
simply by hosting its website.118
II. AEREO: VIRTUALLY ABANDONING TECH-BASED INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have steadfastly adhered to traditional
infringement analysis, continually interpreting the language of the Copyright
Act by the definitions set out in 1976.119 At that time, the public had not even
heard of the Internet, and technologies such as tablets, smartphones, and wireless
networks were certainly not fixtures in our daily lives.120
In the recent Aereo121 decision, the Supreme Court grappled with yet another
new technology involving the Internet.122 The Aereo opinion notably diverts
from the traditional copyright analysis used in the linking opinions by the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits and instead looks at the purpose of the Copyright
Act as the legal system is forced to deal with new and developing
technologies, 123 explicitly acknowledging the vastly changed and uncharted
technological landscape of the twenty-first century.124 The Court dispensed with
a high-level, technical evaluation of Aereo’s video streaming technology in
116. Id.
117. See id. at 761. The Seventh Circuit grasped for a comparable fact pattern to provide a
definition for public performance, looking to Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259
(9th Cir. 1996). Fonovisa was a vicarious infringement case that determined the pirating of music
by the plaintiff who later sold recordings of said music in bulk that were then performed by the
purchasers, an interaction called a “swap meet,” was a performance. See Flava, 689 F.3d at 761.
Finding the factual comparison to Fonovisa too attenuated, the Flava Court then examined In re
Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), another Seventh Circuit case finding
infringement where Aimster software encouraged individuals to share copyrighted music over the
Internet in an “online equivalent of a swap meet.” Flava, 689 F.3d at 762. The Flava Court
ultimately held that because Flava was “not encouraging swapping” it did not “encourage[]
infringement.” Id.
118. See Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 762.
119. See id. at 757–61; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th Cir.
2007).
120. See Imagining the Internet, supra note 43 (discussing the substantial changes the Internet
has facilitated since the 1990s).
121. American Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
122. See id. at 2503.
123. See id. at 2504–06 (discussing the history of the amendments to the Copyright Act in
response to Court decisions and technological changes).
124. Id. at 2511 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or other
provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before us.”).
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favor of an assessment of the party’s relationship with its commercial clients.125
The Court noted that, regardless of what might be going on between computers
and networks behind the scenes, Aereo’s service functioned much like the
community antenna television systems that the Copyright Act targeted with its
1976 changes.126 In making this distinction, the Court shifted the focus from the
technology facilitating infringing activities to the harm to the copyright
owner.127
A. The Technology Bringing Cable to a Computer Near You
Aereo’s online service platform made available live broadcast television
programming—without a license from the copyright holders—with only a few
seconds delay behind the live broadcast to its subscribers. 128 The question
before the Supreme Court was whether Aereo infringed on American
Broadcasting Companies’s (ABC) exclusive right to publicly perform its
programs under the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act 129 by offering a
“technologically complex” subscription service that streamed ABC’s programs
to individual user’s computers almost simultaneously with ABC’s airing.130
The Aereo opinion commenced in a similar fashion to that of the Seventh and
Ninth Circuit opinions described above, unfolding the specific technology by
which Aereo captured ABC’s broadcasts, and then streamed the broadcasts to
subscribers over the Internet.131 The Court took note of the three entities in play:
ABC’s “over-the-air” broadcasts, Aereo’s technology housed in a warehouse,
and the subscriber at home on his personal computer.132 A subscriber, having
125. See id. at 2506–08.
126. Id. at 2511.
127. Id. at 2506–07.
128. Id. at 2503. Subscribers pay Aereo a monthly fee for access to content to which Aereo
“neither owns the copyright . . . nor holds a license from the copyright owners to perform those
works publicly.” Id.
129. The Transmit Clause grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to publicly “transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance” by any technological means “whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
130. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2502–03. Thus, the Court placed great importance on the complexity
of Aereo’s technology as a determinative factor in whether Aereo was publicly performing ABC’s
copyrighted programs.
131. Compare id. (“Aereo’s system is made up of servers, transcoders, and thousands of dimesized antennas housed in a central warehouse.”), with Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754,
756 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing “the embed code contain[ed] [in a] video’s web address plus
instructions for how to display the video” to allow the myVidster platform to “create[] a Web page
that makes the video appear to be on myVidster’s site”) and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To provide this service, Arriba developed a computer program that
‘crawls’ the Web looking for images to index. This crawler downloads full-sized copies of the
images onto Arriba’s server.”).
132. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
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paid for a subscription, selected a show from a list of local programming on
Aereo’s website.133 Aereo’s server automatically responded to the subscriber’s
selection by selecting one of thousands of small antennae stored in its
warehouse, which captured ABC’s broadcast signal and converted it into data
that can be streamed over the Internet to the subscriber’s computer.134 This data
was then saved in a “subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive,” and the
subscriber could download the program right then or save it to watch later.135
In addition to this tripartite analysis, the Aereo Court paid special attention to
exactly where the data for a program, or rather where each copy of a given
program, resides at every step of the process each time a subscriber selects a
program. 136 Aereo, in its own argument, “emphasize[d]” that its technology
designated personal copies of programs for each subscriber, even if more than
one subscriber selected the same program.137
B. Fitting Streaming into a Pre-Internet Framework
The main question before the Supreme Court in Aereo was whether Aereo
simply acted as an equipment provider or whether, via its technology, Aereo
publicly performed ABC’s television programs within the meaning of the
Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act. 138 The Transmit Clause defines a
copyright holder’s exclusive right to publicly perform a work as the right
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time
or at different times.139
The Transmit Clause represents Congress’s solution to the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. 140 and

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. A subscriber can stream a video from any wireless-enabled device—such as his
personal computer, table, smartphone, etc.—and by extension can stream a video from virtually
any location from which he has access to an Internet connection. See id.
136. Id. The Court even cites to A Dictionary of Computing for a definition of “streaming” in
its discussion of how long it takes Aereo to deliver a full program to a subscriber and noting the
almost-instant gratification for users who can view programs mere seconds after ABC broadcasts
them. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 2504.
139. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
140. 392 U.S. 390, 392–93, 402 (1968) (noting that the defendant’s system, which utilized a
system of antennae to transmit cable broadcasts to subscribing customers and had a license from
plaintiff movie copyright holder to broadcast the movies, did not “perform” the movies within the
meaning of the Copyright Act).
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Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 141 which both
centered on the question of whether CATV providers 142 publicly performed
copyrighted cable programs by simply distributing the modified signals to the
public.143 The Transmit Clause dispenses with line drawing that distinguishes
broadcaster functions from viewer functions and provides that, on either end,
both parties perform. 144 The Aereo Court explained that by enacting the
Transmit Clause, Congress “[brought] the activities of cable systems within the
scope of the Copyright Act.”145
Therefore, recognizing “that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider,” the
Court categorized Aereo’s technology as “substantially similar to those of the
CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach,” thus placing
Aereo’s technology under the scrutiny of the Transmit Clause.146
1. Aereo Performs by Streaming
In deciding whether Aereo “performs” ABC’s programs within the meaning
of the Transmit Clause, the Court ultimately ignored the technological nuances
between CATV systems and Aereo’s technology as a basis for deciding who or
what “performs” ABC’s programs.147 Instead, the Court considered the precise

141. 415 U.S. 394, 396–97, 407–409 (1974) (determining that the defendant’s antenna system,
which transmitted copyrighted broadcast programs to separate television stations, did not “perform”
under the Copyright Act).
142. CATV providers used systems consisting of antennae and cables to strengthen
copyrighted broadcast signals, providing better quality versions of television programs to viewers
in their homes. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
143. See id. at 2505. The Court in each case applied a bright-line rule that distinguishes
“broadcasters” from “viewers”—ultimately finding that the “reception and rechanneling” by CATV
of cable broadcasts was akin to a viewer changing the channel on his television set. Teleprompter,
415 U.S. at 408–09. Thus, a CATV provider performed “essentially a viewer function,” did not
perform the programs publicly, and therefore its use did not infringe. Id.
144. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505–06 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 86–87 (1976)).
145. Id. at 2506.
146. Id. The majority dismissed the dissent’s contention that Aereo is not like a CATV
provider because the cable systems transmit “constantly,” whereas Aereo’s technology “remains
inert” until a subscriber makes a request. Id. at 2507.
147. See id. The majority again dismissed the dissent’s assertions that technological
differences between Aereo’s system and CATV systems bring Aereo outside the realm of the
Transmit Clause. See id. The dissent’s argument bears resemblance to the distinctions between
broadcasters and viewers in Fortnightly and Teleprompter that were ultimately rejected by
Congress when it drafted the Transmit Clause. See id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing
interactions between Aereo’s system and its subscribers to a photocopy machine and a customer in
which “the customer chooses the content” and the “photocopier does nothing except in response to
the customer’s commands”); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 412
(1974) (“When a broadcaster transmits a program . . . he has no control over the segment of the
population which may view the program . . . . The use of CATV does not significantly alter this
situation.”); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968) (noting
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technology utilized to be non-determinative with respect to the Transmit Clause
because the operating platform’s functionality, “invisible to subscriber and
broadcaster alike,” in reality, “means nothing to the broadcaster” and most
certainly “means nothing to the subscriber.”148 Rather, the Court reasoned that
the general service Aereo offered to its subscribers was essentially the same as
that of a “traditional cable system.”149 Accordingly, Aereo “performs” just as a
cable provider would under the Transmit Act.150
2. Public Performances from Private Homes
Having decided that Aereo “performs” within the meaning of the Copyright
Act, the Supreme Court then addressed whether that performance was made
“publicly.”151 Aereo claimed that the “performance” occurred independently
from ABC’s transmission and after Aereo had converted a signal into streamingcompatible data.152 The performance, Aereo argued, occurred when the audio
and visual components of a program streamed to a subscriber’s screen. 153
Further, because these performances were individualized and could only be
viewed by a single subscriber, any such performances were private.154
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, rejected the technological distinctions
supporting Aereo’s argument regarding the “behind-the-scenes” channels by
which Aereo produced video programming to its subscribers because such
distinctions, the Court believed, had no bearing on Aereo’s “commercial
objectives” or the “viewing experience” of its subscribers.155 Such distinctions,
Justice Breyer suggested, distracted the infringement analysis from the behavior
Congress meant to regulate under the Copyright Act:
Why would a subscriber who wishes to watch a television show care
much whether images and sounds are delivered to his screen via a
large multisubscriber antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether
they arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether
they are transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made? And
why, if Aereo is right, could not modern CATV systems simply
continue the same commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free
of copyright restrictions, provided they substitute such new
technologies for old? Congress would as much have intended to
“[b]roadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing,
whatever programs they receive”).
148. Id. at 2507 (majority opinion).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2507–08.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2508.
154. Id.
155. Id.

2015]

Aereo, In-line Linking, and a New Approach

795

protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as
from those of cable companies.156
In addition, Justice Breyer remained unpersuaded by Aereo’s argument that
its subscribers watched “personal cop[ies] of the selected program[s],” at
isolated locations, on personal computers, viewable by no one else, would
transport Aereo’s business model outside the scope of the Transmit Clause.157
However, the Court rejected this argument on the grounds that this rationale was
contrary to the legislative intent behind the Transmit Clause. 158 The Court
understood the Transmit Clause to permit “an entity [to] transmit a performance
through one or several transmissions, where the performance [was] of the same
work.”159 The Court, however, drew a distinction noting, “the Act d[id] not
explicitly define ‘the public,’” but rather specified when an entity publicly
performs.160
According to the Court, the Copyright Act “thereby suggests that ‘the public’
consists of a large group of people outside of a family and friends,”161 meaning
Aereo, by “transmit[ing] to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any
prior relationship to the works does so perform.” 162 The language of the
Transmit Clause,163 the Court believed, distinctly refuted Aereo’s contentions
that its transmissions, or performances, could not be considered public because
the videos were viewed at isolated locations and at isolated times. 164
Accordingly, the Court held that Aereo’s online streaming of ABC’s broadcasts
was, in fact, a public performance. 165 Aereo, therefore, infringed on ABC’s
exclusive right to publicly perform its broadcasts.166

156. Id. at 2508–09.
157. See id. at 2508.
158. Id. at 2509.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2509–10. A performance is made “publicly” when performed at “any place where
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
is gathered.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
161. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
162. Id.
163. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that a performance is considered public “whether the members
of the public . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times”).
164. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2511. The Court noted that the dissent would have the majority clarify and narrow
its ruling. Id. at 2507. The dissent suggested that the majority’s opinion has stretched the Transmit
Clause too far and encompasses a technology that “looks like cable TV,” and, in doing so, have
possibly “invent[ed]” a “two-tier version of the Copyright Act, one part of which applies to ‘cable
companies and their equivalents’ while the other governs everyone else.” Id. at 2516 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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3. Narrowly Tailoring the Aereo Decision
Although the Aereo decision determining that an entity that “engages in
activities like Aereo’s” violates the Copyright Act seems broad, the Court
explicitly refrained from expanding its analysis to other emerging
technologies.167 The Court expressly declined to predict or advise future courts
as to how the Copyright Act should apply to “novel issues” where “Congress
has not plainly marked [the] course.” 168 Yet, the Court’s focus on Aereo’s
commercial incentives, the user interaction on the subscriber’s end, and its
explicit decision not to base its decision on technological incongruences appears
to inherently lend itself to application in questions involving such “novel issues,”
such as in-line linking.169
III. A BRAVE NEW WORLD: AEREO OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE COPYRIGHT
ANALYSIS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
The Aereo dissent objected to the majority’s decision believing the ruling
overbroad, arguing the majority deliberately left open how its ruling would
impact the application of copyright law to other technologies.170 However, the
broadness of the majority’s analysis may render the Aereo opinion the
touchstone for analyzing copyright infringement as it applies to new and
developing technologies, despite the majority’s hesitance to extend its rationale
to those cases.171 The Court’s focus on the commercial objectives of the parties,
rather than the differences in technologies, may be exactly what courts need to
adequately keep pace with technologies evolving faster than the law.172
Under traditional copyright analysis, the Court does not weigh the economic
costs of an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work until it has already
determined that infringement has occurred and considered the fair use test.173

167. Id. at 2504 (majority opinion). The Court neither intended nor believed that the Aereo
decision would “discourage or . . . control the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.”
Id. at 2510.
168. Id. at 2511.
169. See id. at 2510–11 (discussing application of the Transmit Clause).
170. See supra note 167–168 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 167–168 and accompanying text.
172. For example, the commercial interest approach could simplify the analysis for courts
confronted with infringement cases that involve in-line linking or framing. The commercial interest
approach refocuses the analysis away from the technological intricacies to the rights at stake and
the harm being done when those rights are violated. See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, The
Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83
B.U. L. REV. 731, 753–57 (2003) (discussing the harm inflicted on copyright holders by
unauthorized use of the holders’ works, how to measure such harm, and how to punish infringers).
173. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (finding use of
a copyrighted song infringement “but for” the court’s finding of fair use).
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Even then, the negative impact on the owner’s market is not necessarily
determinative if outweighed by other fair use factors that favor the defendant.174
A major issue with the Web as a business platform for publishers and artists
is the difficulty in getting consumers to pay for content and media when so much
is already available for free.175 Therefore, it may be injudicious for courts to
delay weighing the economic costs until after it has made a finding of illicit use
of media. Otherwise, the commercial risk for content owners may be a deterrent
in making their creative works available to the public via the Web when their
chance for legal recourse is low.176 In a practical sense, from the perspective of
the third-party user or subscriber, Aereo’s transmission of cable programming
from its website is not so different from the website owner who has in-linelinked an image or video onto his or her website.177 In either case, the user’s
interaction with the content is the same: he or she visits a website and, without
the permission of the copyright holder, gains access to the content.178 In the end,
the user has located and enjoyed what he or she was looking for and is highly
unlikely to seek out the true source or owner of the content.179

174. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[t]he
Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that a commercial use of the copyrighted material ends
the inquiry under” the first prong of the fair use analysis).
175. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 315–17 (2001) (describing the Web as an exponentially-growing
market for an “enormous amount of useful, creative, entertaining, original, and free content,”
including reference materials and major publications such as The Washington Post and The New
York Times); see also Kenneth Olmstead, Amy Mitchell, & Tom Rosenstiel, Where People Go,
How They Get There and What Lures Them Away, PEW RES. JOURNALISM PROJECT (May 9,
2011), http://www.journalism.org/2011/05/09/navigating-news-online/ (explaining how news
organizations draw audiences to their websites and the different revenue-generating platforms they
use).
176. Compare Sam Sanders, Taylor Swift, Platinum Party Of One, NPR (Nov. 5, 2014, 3:32
AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2014/11/05/361577726/taylor-swift-platinum-party-ofone (quoting Taylor Swift in an article about her decision to remove all her music from Spotify
saying, “[m]usic is art, and art is important and rare. Important, rare things are valuable. Valuable
things should be paid for.”); with Lastowka, supra note 175, at 321 (positing that “free access
content is a vital public good, and its availability would probably increase if the copyright laws
were amended to reflect an interest in free access”).
177. Both Aereo and a linking source, in effect, locate and redirect source media to appear on
their respective websites for user consumption. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text
(explaining the dynamics of in-line linking).
178. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2007)
(detailing how a user interacts with Google’s in-line linking application), with Am. Broad. Cos.,
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (explaining how a user interacts with Aereo’s
interface).
179. The user would not think to look for an “original” or “true” source if the media appears
to be an integrated feature of the infringing website. See supra notes 76–78 and associated text
(explaining the characteristics of in-line-linked media).
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The community of website developers and producers views in-line linking as
either infringement, unethical, or at the very least, feels that some proprietary
interest has been violated.180 The negative attitude towards in-line linking is not
necessarily unfounded. There is something inherently deceptive in the act of
embedding a video or image on one’s website in such a way that, in every
practical sense, it appears to be originating from that website.181 If no credit is
given to the true owner and no explanation or notice is offered as to the original
source of the content, the user has no reason to believe the linking site is not the
source of that content. If copyright law is aimed at protecting the exclusive right
of owners and authors of creative works to display and distribute those works,
then the strict application of what it means to “copy” in the digital context has
fallen short.182
Even courts have repeatedly noted that in-line linking can be deceptive when
it leads the user to believe that content originates on the infringing Web page,
yet this distinction does not seem to have significant bearing on the ultimate
holding. 183 In fact, the Amazon court specifically declined to consider user
“impression” believing “consumer confusion” outside the scope of the
Copyright Act.184 Similarly, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have based their
holdings, with respect to in-line linking, on whether non-permissive use of
copyrighted digital media involved saving the content on the alleged infringer’s
own server.185
These judicial opinions define the act of saving data on a server, disk,
computer, or similar medium, as the making of a copy as defined by the
Copyright Act. 186 On the other hand, as the majority in Aereo indicated,
technological distinctions may not be as persuasive in circumstances where the
user is not cognizant of such distinctions.187 Following this line of reasoning, a
180. See generally Masnick, supra note 65 (questioning whether in-line linking constitutes
infringement); Linking, CHILLING EFFECTS, https://www.chillingeffects.org/linking/faq.cgi (last
visited Apr. 6, 2015) (discussing various contentions regarding cease and desist orders); Linking to
Other People’s Images? Allowed?, https://wordpress.org/support/topic/linking-to-other-peoplesimages-allowed (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (soliciting comments regarding the legality of in-line
linking).
181. See Chu & Wang, supra note 79, at 579–80.
182. A tangible “copy” of a book, which can only be consumed by a limited audience at a given
time, is different from a “copy” of a Web page, which “can be read by millions simultaneously.”
Lastowka, supra note 175, at 298. In addition, “[t]hose experiencing content on the Web refer to
the experience as ‘visiting,’ ‘surfing,’ or ‘viewing’ a cyberspatial location,” and would “not feel
they have ‘copied’ anything.” Id. at 298–99.
183. See supra Part I.C (discussing in-line linking court decisions).
184. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court
indicated that consumer confusion would be relevant under the Trademark Act. Id.
185. See supra Part I.C (addressing the basis for the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ findings for
non-infringement).
186. See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text (explaining the “server test”).
187. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 (2014).
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“copy” may not necessarily mean the same thing for digital content as it does
for content in a physical, tangible form.188 Whether content has been “copied”
may depend less on where the content physically resides and more on user
impressions.
For the average user, what goes on “behind the screen” with each mouse click
is a mere abstraction. To this user, the distinction of whether an individual’s
server reserves an original copy of a copyrighted work is irrelevant considering
a user may view the same image on two different websites and, in terms of his
interaction with that content, has actually viewed two separate “copies.”
As previously discussed, not all in-line linking is malicious. 189 The
determinate factor as to whether a case of in-line linking is malicious or not
depends on the objectives of the linking site and the nature of his website.190
These characteristics—user indifference to technological distinctions and
objectives of the website developer performing the in-line linking—could
suggest an appropriate move in the judicial review of in-line linking from a strict
fair use analysis to a broader balancing test, applying both the fair use inquiry as
well as the Aereo commercial interest test.191 Aereo may thus have opened the
doors to a case-by-case analysis that focuses on commercial interests and the
creative rights Congress intended to protect under the Copyright Act.
A. A Refocused Analysis May Better Fit Infringement in New Technological
Contexts
Technology is developing faster than the law.192 It is both impossible and
impractical for the courts to attempt to outfit each particular technology that
changes the way Internet users store, transmit, share, manipulate, or use digital
content with its own tests for infringement and fair use.193 Congress attempted
to preempt this concern with the enactment of the Transmit Clause in 1976.194
However, perhaps as recognized by some on the Aereo Court, the language of
the Transmit Clause takes on broader meaning each time it is stretched to cover
188. See id. at 2509 (finding it immaterial how Aereo transmits each copy).
189. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
190. See Chu & Wang, supra note 79, at 577–78 (positing on the motivation behind malicious
as well as non-malicious in-line linking).
191. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508–09; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,
1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007).
192. Aurele Danoff, The Moral Rights Act of 2007: Finding the Melody in the Music, 1 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 181, 182 (2007).
193. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV.
275, 277 (1989) (noting the futility of judicial and legislative efforts to reconcile copyright law with
emerging technologies using “fact-specific language that has grown obsolete as new modes and
mediums of copyrightable expression have developed”).
194. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating Congress
“broadly defined the term ‘transmit’ to ensure that all future technological advances would be
covered”).
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a new technology that might resemble that of a cable broadcasting company.195
The Aereo dissent may be correct in its assessment of the broadness of the
majority’s opinion, 196 but that ambiguity may yield precedent capable of
responding to future cases involving different technologies the Court has not yet
confronted. It may be more prudent to shift the analysis away from investigating
the technological intricacies and instead focus on the infringer’s objectives in
use of the copyrighted content, particularly because it is the character of the
infringing use with which owners of that material primarily take issue.197
Moving away from a narrow construction of the Copyright Act in the face of
technologically complex facts may position these infringement cases closer to
the spirit of the Copyright Act and the rights Congress intended to protect.198
Interestingly, the Congressional intent in drafting the Copyright Act,
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”199 is entirely consistent
with Tim Berners-Lee’s goals for the World Wide Web.200

195. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority’s narrowing of
the Transmit Clause implicates Cablevision’s RS-DVR); Cartoon Network LP, v. CSC Holdings,
Inc. 536 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that Cablevision’s RS-DVR device does not
implicate even a broad reading of the Transmit Clause).
196. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Aereo majority limited its ruling to
exclude technologically complex mechanisms that have yet to appear before the courts in copyright
infringement claims:
It will take years, perhaps decades, to determine which automated systems now in
existence are governed by the traditional volitional-conduct test and which get the Aereo
treatment. (And automated systems now in contemplation will have to take their
chances.) The Court vows that its ruling will not affect cloud-storage providers and
cable-television systems, but it cannot deliver on that promise given the imprecision of
its result-driven rule.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
197. See id. at 2510 (majority opinion) (noting the objective of Aereo is to transmit cable
programming to “large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the
works,” while the objective of an “entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their
capacities as owners or possessors does not perform to ‘the public’”).
198. Technological remedies alone may not suffice to resolve these issues. See Allison Roarty,
Link Liability: The Argument for Inline Links and Frames As Infringements of the Copyright
Display Right, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1011, 1057 (1999) (concluding that there are several reasons
to avoid reliance upon technical solutions). “First, technological remedies [will] soon become
obsolete.” Id. Second, even if such remedies were to exist, “copyright law should be able to protect
copyrightable expression, no matter the medium.” Id. In addition, “[c]opyright law is intended to
provide authors with an incentive to create works that benefit the public” and such “[u]nwanted
links lessen the value of online content.” Id. at 1057–58. Such a “[l]ack of protection for online
works sap authors’ incentive [to create] and may result in fewer online works that benefit the
public.” Id. at 1058.
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
200. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing Berners-Lee’s vision for
universality of the World Wide Web).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The ability of the Internet to provide such vast resources and connectivity is
what has made it a fixture in much of the population’s lives. Constant innovation
in computing technology has continued to open channels for communication and
connectivity, yet for every innovation there is the potential for bad-faith activity
and problems in many areas of law, including copyright. The Aereo Court’s
explicit application of a commercial interest rationale signaled a jurisprudential
transition from probing the technological distinctions toward investigating the
effects of using a particular technology in copyright infringement claims. Aereo
may well provide a viable guidepost for courts to examine when addressing
future infringement claims concerning evolving technologies. Such an inquiry
could change the outcome of technology-based copyright claims, do more to
protect the commercial interests of creators online, and preserve the spirit of
knowledge sharing and universal access on the Internet.
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